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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Kremlin continues to deepen its reliance on the Russian Orthodox
Church-Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) as a lever of soft power in Russian
foreign policy. Constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020 suggest
that this church-state partnership is poised to grow stronger in the
coming years. Recognizing that the ROC’s international undertakings
function to echo Kremlin objectives, policymakers should consider
scrutinizing church activities and interactions with civil society and
government interlocutors, with an eye toward identifying and minimizing
opportunities for Kremlin influence and interference.
KEY TAKEAWAYS

This brief is a product

•

The ROC has served as a steadfast soft power echo for Russian foreign policy interests
during the Putin era, particularly as the Kremlin seeks to project an outsized vision of
the “Russian world” beyond its national borders.

•

Constitutional amendments ratified in July 2020 are likely to bolster Kremlin foreign
policy priorities in key areas: sovereignty and noninterference, the falsification of history,
the rights of compatriots, and traditional values.

•

The ROC is poised to play an enlarged role in promoting these foreign policy
objectives by conducting international outreach and advocacy, marshalling like-minded
constituencies, exporting traditional values worldwide, and reinforcing key Kremlin
narratives.

of the Geopolitics of
Religious Soft Power
(GRSP) project, a multiyear, cross-disciplinary
effort to systematically
study state use of religion
in foreign affairs.

The conclusions and recommendations of this Berkley Center publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not
reflect the views of the center, its leadership, or its other scholars.

INTRODUCTION
In January 2020, President Putin surprised
Russians and the world by proposing a
sweeping set of constitutional reforms.
Despite an emphasis on domestic policy and
the welfare state, the push for amendments
signaled a distinct preoccupation with Russia’s
international standing. Putin’s proposed
reforms began by asserting that “Our nation’s
sovereignty must be unconditional…Russia
has returned to international politics as a
country whose opinion cannot be ignored.”1
Propelled by this outward-facing orientation,
Putin’s first suggested amendments sought
to curb the domestic impact of any decisions
taken by international bodies regarding Russia’s
international obligations.
Putin’s traditional allies were quick to embrace
his invitation to propose further amendments.
Among others, Patriarch Kirill, head of the
ROC, suggested believers should “pray and work
so God would be mentioned in our foundational
law.”2 President Putin answered these prayers by
endorsing Kirill’s proposal and bundling it into
the list of revised amendments delivered to the
State Duma in March 2020.3 Within a matter
of days—and with virtually no opposition—
Putin’s package of amendments secured the
approval of various government bodies. In July
2020, citizens overwhelmingly endorsed the
amendments in a public vote,4 thus blessing
the largest overhaul of the Russian constitution
since its original ratification in 1993.
The approved constitutional amendments
cover wide ground, ranging from social and
welfare benefits to reorganization of the state’s
political power structure. But lost in this torrent
of reform are certain key amendments that also
harbor significant implications for Russian
foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
2020 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Central among the constitutional amendments
with potential implications for Russian
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foreign policy are provisions that entrench: a
muscular vision of state sovereignty, a statesanctioned historical truth, the obligation to
protect Russian compatriot rights abroad,
and traditional values as a core component of
Russian national identity.

Boosting State Sovereignty
Russia’s Constitutional Court is now
authorized to render unenforceable any
international ruling against Russia—including
from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR)—where it deems the decision to be
contrary to Russia’s constitution and public
order.5 In addition, by requiring that Russia
“tak[e] measures to…prevent interference
in the internal affairs of the state,”6 the
constitution now provides fresh cover for the
Kremlin’s global promotion of multipolarity.

Prohibiting Falsification
Another amendment prohibits the spread
of information questioning Russia’s official
narrative regarding WWII. This prohibition
has clear outward-facing implications for the
projection of Russian power and civilization
on the international stage. As Putin has
cautioned, tarnishing Russia’s historical
reputation is nothing less than “a threat to the
fundamental principles of the world order.”7
This newly constitutionalized imperative
to combat falsification augurs a raft of
international challenges, including condoning
crimes committed under the Soviet occupation
and amplifying the Kremlin’s ongoing
disinformation campaigns.8

Supporting Compatriot Rights
An additional amendment expanding
government support to “compatriots living
abroad in the exercise of their rights”9 can
also be linked to Russia’s projection of power
abroad. The definitional fluidity attached to
the term “compatriots” strengthens the case for
a larger “Russian world” (Russkiy mir) outside
of Russia proper that demands active Kremlin
protection. This framing in turn amplifies

Kremlin opportunities for expanding its
political influence and intelligence-gathering
abroad.10

Enshrining Traditional Values
The traditional values-centric amendments
serve to reinforce the Kremlin’s civilizational
identity-building project and its related
multipolarity campaign. Anchoring Russia’s
national identity in these religiously steeped
conservative values burnishes Russia’s bona
fides as the vanguard of an anti-West coalition
committed to contesting international human
rights norms.11
According to this narrative, only Russia can
thwart the West’s effort to impose global
“ultra-liberalism.” In Putin’s words, “efforts are
being taken today to…destroy the traditional
values….”12 And this “clash of civilizations”
poses a strategic threat to Russia’s geopolitical
interests: “[P]romoting…LGBT [rights] and
spreading the ideas of radical feminism…
dilute[e] the values of family and marriage….
[such a] society…is a perfect target for socalled coloured revolutions.”13

CEMENTING THE ROC’S ROLE AS
FAVORED SOFT POWER TOOL
The ROC has long rallied around advancing
the now constitutionally enshrined vision
outlined above. In embracing this mission, it
has fortified the Kremlin’s campaign against
the perceived civilizational threat posed by
the West’s “mindless multiculturalism”14 and
peddled a vision of Russia “predestined to be
the guardian of global balance, not merely in
geopolitical but…in a moral/ethical sense.”15

ROC Advocacy of Noninterference,
Sovereignty, and Multipolarity
ROC diplomacy attests to an enduring
commitment to the Kremlin’s preferred
international order. In 1999, then
Metropolitan Kirill lamented “new forms of
confrontation in which…interference in the
life of nations have been realized through

political and economic actions.”16 Kirill further
asserted that: “Orthodoxy in international
politics [could facilitate] the building up of a
multipolar world.”17 Nearly a quarter century
later, the church’s framing of noninterference
has led it to reject decisions emerging from
the ECtHR and other human rights bodies
as being alien and harmful to Russian
sovereignty.18 The ROC’s contemporary
devotion to multipolarity remains equally
undiminished, with one church leader recently
speculating that the COVID-19 pandemic
could help bring about “the real emergence of
a multipolar world.”19
Most tellingly, however, the ROC’s wholesale
embrace of Kremlin policy surrounding
sovereignty and noninterference is revealed in
the occasions when both actors appear willing
to jettison principle in the name of realpolitik.
Consider the Kremlin’s interventionist
stance regarding Montenegro’s recently
enacted Law on Freedom of Religion or
Beliefs.20 To validate its abandonment of
non-interference, Russia’s Foreign Ministry
proffered impressive verbal gymnastics: “We
are categorically against any interference
in internal affairs. [But this law]…could
affect the interests of the Metropolitanate
of Montenegro…[Therefore], it goes beyond
national boundaries and concerns the unity
and cohesion of the Orthodox World.”21
In this instance, Kremlin intervention cloaked
in ostensible concern for the Orthodox world
coincidentally seeks to diminish Western
influence and advance Russia’s push for
multipolarity. This decidedly secular motive
has not deterred the ROC from reiterating
the Kremlin’s temporal concerns and fueling
the tension in Montenegro. In fact, the
church has dutifully mobilized its various
channels to echo Kremlin attacks on the new
religious freedom law and the Montenegrin
government more generally.
From Patriarch Kirill’s perspective, events in
Montenegro are akin to a “Ukrainian scenario”
that encroaches “on canonical Orthodoxy.”22
As such, the matter is exempted from the
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niceties of noninterference. Revealingly, the
patriarch’s invocation of a “Ukraine scenario”
ties back to the Kremlin’s larger concern over
Montenegro’s political alignment to the West.
In the church’s words: “The current authorities
of Montenegro do not conceal that they are
active supporters of eurointegration and
isolation from Serbia and for this reason they
seek to discredit [our] common historical
spiritual and cultural heritage.”23 The prospect
of a loss of Russian influence within this
tiny country augurs so deep a blow to the
Kremlin that the patriarch has gone as far as
to insinuate that Montenegrin officials have
subjected Orthodox faithful to torture.24
The ROC’s eagerness to intervene in
Montenegro’s internal affairs directly serves
Kremlin foreign policy by fueling Montenegrin
political and social instability. On a still
more sinister note, it also sows the seeds for
potentially more egregious intervention from
Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s
declaration that Russia “will always defend
the interests of Orthodox Churches,”25
coupled with the freshly minted constitutional
imperative to protect “compatriot” rights,
leaves open the possibility of expanding the
Kremlin’s compatriot umbrella to include
non-Russian ROC-aligned believers.
The case of Montenegro signals that, like the
Kremlin, the ROC will vociferously defend
sovereignty to shield Russia and its allies from
international scrutiny, but quickly discard
the norm in the service of Russia’s foreign
interests. The Kremlin’s decision to intervene
in Syria provides another case in point. The
church’s deafening silence in the face of
credible reporting of war crimes linked to
Russian military operations26 in that country
betrays the full extent of its unflinching
support for the Kremlin’s selective grasp of
international norms.

The ROC as Guard Dog for Kremlin Truth
Over a decade ago, Russia’s Foreign Ministry
and the ROC pledged to continue “joint
efforts to combat the falsification of history.”27
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Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov renewed this
vow in 2020, proclaiming that “the diplomatic
service will continue to do its best to counter
attempts to falsify history [through] close
cooperation with the Russian Orthodox
Church.”28
With falsification rendered constitutionally
anathema, the church is poised to continue
consecrating the Kremlin’s international push
to brand as fascist any critic of Soviet glory. As
part of this effort, the church advocates within
the compatriot community abroad to nurture
a shared vision of historical memory.29
The church also wields the Kremlin’s historical
narrative as a carrot and stick, both to build
potential alliances and to exert pressure on
less cooperative foreign governments. For
example, the church recently lauded Croatian
officials for restoring a memorial to Soviet
soldiers, calling it “one of these profoundly
symbolic actions which help preserve
historical memory.”30 In contrast, Patriarch
Kirill directed a six-minute long harangue
at the Bulgarian president for remarks Kirill
deemed “outrages” of historical revisionism
that depreciated the primary role of Russian
state power and sacrifice.31
Through actions like these, the church
energetically reinforces the Kremlin’s view
that Russia’s reputation is sacrosanct, and that
any perceived slight against it—including
the “criminal war on monuments”32—is
tantamount to the glorification of Nazism.
In this context, as with the compatriot policy
discussed below, the church can act without
the diplomatic fetters that might otherwise
bind Russia’s Foreign Ministry. Thus, Patriarch
Kirill’s remarks in Bulgaria “aggressively
push[ed] the Russian nationalist agenda…in
a way that even the Russian Foreign Ministry
avoids when dealing with what it considers
‘friendly’ nations.”33
The church’s readiness to echo the Kremlin’s
party line on the international stage extends
beyond Russia’s WWII legacy. According to
Sergei Lavrov, Russia “had accumulated great

experience in ensuring the co-existence of
people of various creeds” and “protect[ing]
true religious values.”34 This statement
expunges a checkered history of statesanctioned religious persecution and ongoing
discrimination for the purpose of holding
Russia out as an export-ready civilizational
alternative to the West.
The church has embraced this disingenuous
narrative unreservedly. In a speech delivered
at the 2011 International Ecumenical Peace
Convocation, Metropolitan Hilarion set
aside Russia’s role in the production and
dissemination of The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion and the forcible expulsion of Muslim
Tatars from Crimea to boast: “In Russia
there have been no religious wars or religious
confrontations in our history. People in our
country have been able to find a language
of mutual understanding…despite their
differences in faith.”35

The ROC as Global Nexus for Cultivating
Compatriots
Foreign Minister Lavrov has also lauded the
church’s cooperation “helping the Russian
diaspora and protecting the rights of Russians
who have found themselves far away from the
Homeland.”36 The church’s global network
and deep involvement with other compatriotfocused organizations confirms its pivotal
role in echoing Kremlin messaging to this
constituency. For example, the World Russian
People’s Council (WRPC), essentially a
church-directed NGO, functions as a linchpin
compatriot-networking organization that
advocates Russian interests abroad, including
through UN lobbying. Similarly, the church
maintains formal cooperation agreements
with a range of governmental organizations
engaged in compatriot outreach and efforts
to augment international support for Russian
policy, including the Federal Agency for
Compatriots Abroad and the Russkiy Mir
Foundation.37
Tapping into the ROC’s religious and
cultural terroir provides the Kremlin with

two significant advantages: First, the church
promotes Kremlin messages without the
baggage attached to more overtly statebacked outlets such as RT and Sputnik.
Second, given the global breadth of church
diplomacy, the Kremlin can access more
diverse constituencies that transcend the
narrow realm of compatriots. With the ROC
operating as convenor of compatriots, other
clergy, and foreign government officials,38 the
Kremlin gains a seemingly neutral channel
for actively informing and influencing global
opinion on Russia.
The onset of a constitutional obligation to
protect compatriot rights and interests also
raises the possibility of passportization being
extended to include to non-Russian Orthodox
believers.39 If defending Russian civilization
includes the protection of Orthodoxy, and the
definitional fluidity of compatriots can flex to
include “individuals who make the free choice
of a spiritual, cultural, and legal link to the
Russian Federation,”40 it may not be too great
a leap to suggest that Moscow might seek to
render Orthodoxy a basis for passportization
to justify further foreign interventions in the
name of Christian communities expressing
affinity and support for Russia.41
On a less extreme level, church outreach to
other Orthodox “compatriots” hints at regions
and countries where the Kremlin may seek
to expand its influence using Orthodox ties
as a bridgehead.42 From this perspective, the
constitutional amendment on compatriots
may signal additional fuel for Russian
messianism and the Kremlin’s framing of
the country and its civilization as the last
bulwark against a godless world overrun by
the corrupting influence of the ultra-liberal
West.43

The ROC’s Crown Jewel: Spreading
Traditional Values Everywhere
If the constitutional amendments discussed
above merely infer an enlarged role for
the ROC as a chief soft power exporter of
the Kremlin’s foreign policy priorities, the
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amendments entrenching traditional values
render this role inescapable. At least in part
directly attributable to the ROC’s lobbying,44
the traditional values amendments enshrine
the church’s function as guardian of Russia’s
spiritual and moral identity.
Infusing these values with newfound
constitutional status reinforces the likelihood
that they will be disseminated globally
to oppose Western “ultra-liberalism” and
shore up the Kremlin’s campaign for greater
international influence. Notably, the church
has portrayed traditional values as under siege
for longer than the Kremlin, and without any
pretense of diplomatic nicety: “It may well
be…that the entire Western civilization…is
becoming radically anti-Christian and antireligious. In this case there is a need of not
only a pan-European but also of a universal
common front formed by traditional religious
confessions in order to repel the onslaught of
militant secularism.”45
To help strengthen Russia’s global position,
the church has reached out to a range
of religious constituencies and courted
conservative activists, compatriots, simpatico
foreign governments, and political operatives.
Through these efforts, the ROC staunchly
opposes any perceived encroachments on
traditional values while simultaneously
promoting the Kremlin’s international
leadership as the most effective guardian of
these values.
For example, the church’s engagement with
other “fraternal” churches often seeks to
undercut Western institutions from within.
In one visit to Bulgaria—an EU member
state—Patriarch Kirill used a meeting with
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to urge
Bulgarians to reject the EU for imposing
“behaviours believed to be sinful by Christians
and ethically unnatural.”46 The ROC similarly
invokes traditional values to build common
ground with other non-Orthodox religious
faiths. As one human rights organization
concluded, this “unholy alliance” unifies
“traditionalist
actors
from
Catholic,
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evangelical, Mormon…and Muslim faith
backgrounds” to “[attempt] to revert feminist
and sexual rights gains at the international
level.”47
The 2016 Havana Declaration, signed by
the ROC and the Vatican, exhibits this
latter type of outreach, while illustrating the
ROC’s use of traditional values to validate
Kremlin foreign policy. Among other things,
the declaration laments secularization;
calls attention to endangered Christian
communities in the Middle East; and offers
up generic pleas for peace in Ukraine, Syria,
and elsewhere.48 But it painstakingly avoids
any direct criticism of Russia. Instead, the
declaration promotes a view of the ROC and
Kremlin as neutral peacemakers committed
to protecting endangered Christians, and
positions the Vatican as condoning Russia’s
foreign adventurism.
The church’s ability to invoke traditional values
as a vehicle for garnering support for Russian
policy is similarly reflected in its outreach to
conservative civil society groups, leaders from
across Europe, and “their comrades from the
American heartland.”49 For example, C-Fam,
a U.S.-based “pro-family” NGO, has fawned
over the ROC’s rejection of a UNICEF brief
calling for the elimination of discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.50 Elsewhere, the International
Organization of the Family has sought to
boost ROC and Kremlin policies, accepting
Kremlin-connected
Orthodox
oligarch
funding,51 endorsing “a very prominent
role [for Russia]…on a global scale,” 52 and
celebrating Russia as “the Christian saviors of
the world.” 53

CONCLUSIONS
The amendments discussed above provide
constitutional cover for reenergizing the
Kremlin’s global efforts to challenge democratic
values, supplant the international human
rights system, and destabilize institutions
and societies through misinformation and

disinformation campaigns. Given the ROC’s
longstanding willingness to serve as a spear tip
for the soft power advancement of these efforts,
the constitutional amendments are likely to
usher in an even tighter era of church-state
integration. Policymakers should take note of
the ROC’s burgeoning foreign policy role and
make necessary adjustments to account for the
church’s increasing proximity to the Kremlin
and its ongoing influence campaigns unfolding
among governmental and non-governmental
interlocutors alike.
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